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Knowledge is nothing but the more or less conscious expression of a physical, biological, and 
psychological order, and the fundamental structures of all systems of symbols, natural and 
formal, reflect a natural order. Metaphor corresponds to natural analogy. Thus the study of 
multivocal sentences is relevant both for epistemology and metaphysics. Knowledge cannot 
make any progress in the search for unity without the scientists and the philosopher's ability to 
grasp analogies. 
 
I will describe the dynamics of multivocal sentences and I will provide a list with the 
characteristics which contribute to clarity or obscurity of sense in multivocal sentences and to 
the intelligibility or unintelligibility of the things about which we speak multivocally. This 
research is centered on the movement between senses and on the movement between senses 
and referent. 
 
§ 1. — On multivocal sentences whose first sense is essential for obtaining the     
          second sense 
 
Consider the sentence "Passions are the pagans of the soul." This sentence has the following 
structure: passions are to the soul as pagans are to all believers. To obtain the meaning of the 
expression under analysis, it is necessary to know the ordinary meanings of the terms of the 
structure. Of course this is not all one has to know; it is also necessary to know how those terms 
are related. That is why the structure of the sentence is important. Just how is the conjunction 
"as" in "passions are to the soul as pagans are to all believers " to be  understood? To be sure , 
not as meaning "...is exactly what..." or "...is identical with ... with respect to...". Otherwise, it 
would be enough to know how pagans and all believers are related to know how passions are 
related to the soul and, from the point of view of understanding, a multivocal sentence like the 
one studied here would be an awkward way of expressing a thought. But this is not so. 
 
"Pagans" is a name for a group of people. "All believers" is also a name for another group of 
people. The relationship between those groups can be specified. On the other hand, "passions" 
is a name for a set of experiences and "soul" is a name for, say, the spiritual part of a person. 
Suppose now that "as" means "...is identical with ... with respect to ...". It follows that the 
relationship between passions and soul can be specified just as, i.e., exactly as, the relationship 
between pagans and all believers can be specified. Evidently this is not so since some of the 
relations between those groups of people are economics, etc., and not such relations exist 
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between states of the soul and the soul. Of course, concrete things such  as passions, believers, 
etc., and their concrete relations cannot be identical. When we say that two things are identical, 
what we mean is that they are identical in some respects. To consider something in some 
respect, we must suspend all irrelevant respects. Can we say then that "as" means "... is identical 
with ... with respect to..." at some level of abstraction? Clearly not, because abstraction is not to  
 
be carried out at random but according to the demands imposed by the sense of the words of 
an expression and by their relations. Abstraction, then, is already interpretation. By this I mean  
that in abstracting we are already interpreting, first, what meanings of the words in the 
expression are relevant and second, how those meanings are related. The conjunction "as" in 
"passions are to the soul as pagans are to all believers" means "somehow like" in an unspecified 
sense of "like". "As" introduces an irreducible obscurity. Such an obscurity can be the authentic 
unstable ambiguity of an expression and the authentic vagueness of sense. 
 
According to the notion of distance, the figurative meaning of "passions are the pagans of the 
soul" can be obtained as follows: first, we have to be familiar with the language in which the 
sentence is uttered; here at least this step is important, namely the distinction of subject-phrase 
and predicative-phrase. Second we have to understand the structure of the sentence. At least 
these two steps are important: the placing of the elements of the structure in their proper places 
and the interpretation of their relations. Another way of describing this second operation is to 
say that we must imaginatively abstract some properties of the referent of the predicative-phrase 
arising in their relations to the subject-phrase, and then apply those properties to our 
conception of the referent of the subject-phrase. 
 
Before I illustrate this abstract description, I must say that the application of the notion of 
distance to the thought "passions are the pagans of the soul" in which the first sense is essential 
for obtaining the second sense, shows how complex the understanding of such cases are in 
comparison with the understanding of sentences whose meanings have been fixed. 
 
Let us consider the word "pagan" in the present context. "Pagan" in the expression under analysis 
does not refer to a kind of person (non-Christian) but to a kind of psychological state, thus this 
sentence can be interpreted as nonsensical. But the relation of this sentence to its verbal context 
(e.g., the fact that this sentence is part of a poem), to its non-verbal context (e.g., the fact that the 
poem is found in a poetry book in the literary section of the library) plus the "set" of our minds 
(e.g., the fact that our background allows us to recognize poetic languages) make us suspect that 
a second, non-literal meaning is intended, all of which compels us to interpret the sentence in a 
way such that it makes sense. Well, then, if the seemingly preposterous assertion that passions 
are the pagans of the soul is not nonsense, what does it mean? Since "pagan" is used non-
literally, let's begin by exposing its literal meaning. "Pagan" has meant or means sundry things: 
(1) peasant or civilian; (2) the opposite of the Christian soldier; (3) a person who is neither a 
Christian, nor a Jew, nor a Moslem; (4) a person who is not religious; (5) a polytheistic person; 
(6) idolater; etc. In what sense is "pagan" being used in the sentence "passions are the pagans of 
the soul"? In all of them, unless the context restricts the number of possible senses. (This is 
what is meant by saying that metaphorical discourse is "rich" in meaning). What are the 
connotations brought by the word "pagan"? I think the more telling senses are (4), (5), and (6): I 
think they imply that passions are wrong. From the point of view of monotheist religious 
people, those who do not believe in God have failed to see that man has been created 
religiously, they are mistaken; they should be corrected; thus passions should also be corrected. 
From the point of view of monotheist religious people, to believe in many gods is to 
misunderstand the meaning of the concept of God; they should be corrected; thus passions 
should also be corrected. According to Christians, idolatry is wrong because it is paying 
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attention to the wrong objects; it should be corrected; thus passions should also be corrected. 
The connotation I can get by examining the senses of "pagan" I am familiar with is that passions 
are wrong and that perhaps reason alone is right, that reason alone be baptized. 
 
As a result, "passions are the pagans of the soul" can mean several things; to some imaginary 
rationalist it can suggest (a) that passions should be rejected because they have no cognitive  
value; and to some imaginary moralists, it can suggest (b) that passions are immoral, not 
edifying. (Although if cognitive values are edifying, the connection is close.)  
 
Once the above interpretation is given, we can see how the latent contribution of senses (1), (2), 
and (3) can become manifest. 
 
In the present example, the second, indirect, metaphorical meaning is obtained by never 
disposing of the literal meaning of the words constructing the comparison. (Under "literal 
meaning" I include senses from (1) to (6)). 
 
In "passions are the pagans of the soul", as in most multivocal sentences, the second, figurative 
intentionality influences the first, literal intentionality and, as a result, under the spell of 
"passions are the pagans of the soul" it becomes difficult not to see pagans as obscure, hard to 
control, and irrational, as passions are, according to a long tradition in Western culture. This is 
what I mean by saying that there is an interaction, more specifically, a movement between the 
many intentionalities of multivocal expressions. 
 
Because we do not know exactly how the mind works, in all cases of multivocal sentences it is 
impossible to say exactly what operations and steps would allow us to cover the distance 
between the many intentionalities of multivocal sentences, but in some cases some accuracy is 
possible provided that the many intentionalities are fixed and remain so. Since the 
intentionalities of multivocal sentences whose first sense is essential for obtaining the second 
sense are not fixed, as the above example illustrates, to establish what operations and steps 
would allow to go from one intentionality to the other is relatively more difficult. 
 
Throughout the analysis of "passions are the pagans of the soul" we have seen how the first sense 
of a multivocal sentence can be essential for obtaining the second sense. The necessity of the 
literal intentionality can be thought of as an historical necessity, and just as the political 
tendencies derived, in some way or other, form Marxism, help us to assess the reach and 
limitations of some of its doctrines, the figurative intentionality of "pagan" helps us to assess the 
reach and limitations of its literal meaning. 
 
Now, if by "historical" is meant contingent, then I propose that the relation between the senses 
of an expression whose first sense is essential for obtaining the second, be thought of as a logical 
relation. Thus the relation between senses is both historical and logical. Seeing both senses as 
historically related is useful for understanding the dynamic interaction between them; seeing 
them as logically related is useful for understanding the necessity of such interaction. 
 
The metaphor and its interpretation are not synonyms as they are when the relationship 
between senses is arbitrary. I mean that the metaphor and its interpretation are not like 
definiendum  and definiens  of nominal definitions. The interpretation can be compared to the 
analysandum  and the metaphor to the analysans  of a "real" definition because this analysans  
does not pretend to exhaust the meaning of the analysandum,  as definiens  does with respect to 
the definiendum.  In short, when the relationship between senses is essential, the figurative 
meaning of a multivocal expression is open to further development and to different versions of 
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itself. On the other hand, when the relationship between senses is arbitrary, the figurative 
meaning is closed in and by its interpretation. 
 
Sometimes one uses figurative expressions because a more direct way of speaking is not 
available, or for reasons of economy of words, although I do not want to commit myself to the  
view that metaphor is an extension of an impoverished language. But, what is more important, 
the example analyzed shows that there are multivocal expressions whose second intentionality 
(sense and referent) necessarily depends upon the first one because unless the hearer or reader 
understands the first intentionality of the multivocal expression, he would not understand the 
second one. 
 
§ 2. — On how the second sense is implicit in the first sense when the first sense is   
           essential for obtaining the second sense  
 
In section (i) I have described the movement between the first and the second sense when the 
former is essential for obtaining the latter. In section (ii) I describe the movement between 
senses from a more particular point of view. 
 
It may be said that the second, indirect, figurative meaning of a sentence is suggested by, or 
latent in, immersed in, arising from, the first, direct, literal meaning. I comprehend these ways 
in which the second sense is related to the first under the category "implicitness", asking how the 
second sense of a multivocal expression may be implicit in the first when the first sense is 
essential for obtaining the second. 
 
Some linguistic expressions, especially some poetic linguistic expressions, suggest or evoke 
pictorial images. If this is all a certain expression does and since a picture does not say any 
thing, then the verbal expression whose meaning is exhausted once the pictorial element is 
evoked does not say anything. In this case we do not have to consider the way in which the 
evoked image is implicit in the first sense because we are dealing with verbal expressions which 
say something. But if the evoked image is in turn verbally expressed, the discussion of 
implicitness becomes of course applicable. 
 
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for saying something explicitly? Obviously, an 
incomplete sentence does not fulfil all the requirements for explicitness for, in order for an 
incomplete sentence to be understood, it has to be completed, and it may be that the 
completion can take more than one form, and the sentence may be completed to mean 
different things. Even if an incomplete sentence can be completed in only one way, still what is 
explicitly said may not be clear because the verbal and non-verbal context may indicate that the 
sentence is ironic, or rhetorical, etc. The same holds for a complete sentence. Therefore a 
complete sentence in a full verbal and non verbal context should be both necessary and 
sufficient for obtaining the explicit meaning of a sentence. 
 
Consider the sentence "races condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a 
second opportunity on earth." To understand the explicit meaning of this sentence we would 
have to find out, among other things, the explicit meaning of the word race". This word has 
several scientific as well as unscientific meanings, e.g., it can mean a major biological division of 
mankind, an ethnic group, or a geographic or national group, or group of people having the 
same ancestry, or lineage, family, clan, etc. Now, any of these meanings can fit in the present 
sentence and we do not know which one to prefer, unless we examine the novel where this 
assertion is made, to see what kinds of groups are alluded to or suggested; that is what I meant 
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by a full context. (If we do so, we will realize that it is primarily a family, and secondarily a 
whole town, that are condemned to such long solitude.) All of which indicates that the explicit  
meaning is obtained by appealing to what is implicitly said and to other things said explicitly. On 
the other hand, something which is implicit, e.g., that races condemned to one hundred years of 
solitude had a first opportunity, can be grasped without having to read the novel. Furthermore, 
that "races condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a second opportunity 
somewhere else" is not going to be readily accepted. 
 
Examples such as the one analyzed above illustrate, first, that what is explicitly said is not 
obviously clearer nor is it obviously easier to grasp than what is implicit. Second, that what is 
explicitly said is obtained by appealing to what is implicit and explicit elsewhere. Third, the 
example illustrates that what is implicitly said may be so in sundry ways.  
 
So far, implicit in the sense of being linguistically presupposed has been distinguished from 
implicit in the sense of being cognitively presupposed. A sentence is linguistically presupposed 
if between the expressed sentence and the sentence presupposed there is a logical, semantical, 
syntactical, or pragmatical connection. A sentence is cognitively presupposed if in saying 
something explicitly one is bound to another sentence, the presupposed sentence, in the light of 
what is known about reality. Accordingly, it would be linguistically unsound, given the way we 
properly use language, to say "races condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a 
second opportunity on earth, nor had they a first opportunity", if the verbal and non-verbal 
context make it clear that nothing important is lost by saying, instead, that races condemned to 
one hundred years of solitude did not have an opportunity on earth at all. Moreover, correctly 
assuming that what moves, moves at some speed or other measurable by clock time, it would be 
empirically unsound to say "time flies, although it is absolutely impossible to measure its 
velocity". Therefore the person who says something is linguistically and/or cognitively bound to 
the presuppositions of what he says. 
 
When the relationship between senses is a necessary one, the second sense is both linguistically 
and cognitively implicit in the first. Suppose that (A) "passions are the pagans of the soul" is 
interpreted as (B) "passions enjoy a low status in the hierarchy of the soul". (B) is semantically 
related to (A) because it presupposes that we have understood the literal meaning of (A), as we 
saw in section (i). (B) is also cognitively related to (A) because (B) presupposes, among other 
things, knowledge of pagans and of their relations to all believers. 
 
The examples in sections (iii) and (iv) will also illustrate the necessity of the assertion that, when 
the relationship between senses is a necessary one, the second sense is both linguistically and 
cognitively implicit in the first. 
 
But a sentence can not only be presupposed by another sentence: it can also be suggested. A 
suggestion is not close to the surface of a text as is a presupposition. The relationship between 
the sentence that allegedly makes the suggestion and the suggestion is not as clear, not as tight, 
as it is with presuppositions. Thus, whether a meaning is implicit in the sense of suggested can, 
at times, be problematic. 
 
In his novel, Abel Sánchez, Miguel de Unamuno says: 
 
"In this book, Memoirs of a Doctor, Joaquín would paint the definitive portraits — their names 
slightly altered in fictional guise — of Abel and Helena, and these portraits would be the ones to 
stand for all time. His portrait of the pair would be worth all the portraits Abel would ever paint. 
And Joaquín savored the satisfaction of knowing that if he were successful in creating this 
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literary portrayal of Abel Sánchez he would immortalize his subject more surely than Abel's 
own painting would do, so that critics and commentators in a remote time would discover the 
actual person of the painter only when they penetrated the thin veil of fiction." 
 
Suppose someone says that this passage suggests that Unamuno believes in the supremacy of 
literature over painting to describe the depths of the soul. Another reader may object to this by 
saying that, in the first place, the one who talks here about paintings and literary portrayal is not 
Unamuno but Joaquín; and, secondly, that such a general assertion is not suggested because 
Joaquín says these literary portrayals will be better than Abel's paintings. The first reader can 
reply by saying that Unamuno himself has held Joaquín's view somewhere else, which makes his 
interpretation plausible, etc. These two readers can argue much longer: this much suffices to 
show that whether something is implicit at all is sometimes quite problematic and rests in the 
wider context. 
 
What the first reader claims to be implicit is not close to the surface of what is explicitly said to 
be easily and readily accepted. What is claimed to be implicit is neither linguistically nor 
cognitively presupposed. What the first reader claims to be implicit is brought forth mainly 
because the reader knows that what seems to be said implicitly is related to or adds some 
information to what has been said explicitly somewhere else by the same author or by 
somebody else. Thus, the meaning suggested complicates, complements, or alludes to what has 
been said before, and it is possible to use some or all of these terms, complement, 
complication, and allusion, to name the modes just analyzed. 
 
There are other senses in which a meaning can be suggested. Suppose that a novel narrates the 
life of a hedonist. Once this "fact" becomes clear to us, we think we can predict his major 
decisions. Our predictions will be suggestions made not by one single sentence but by a whole 
series of them constituting a pattern or structure, and the suggestion is then made by this 
structure, and the hearer or reader can obtain it by comparison and by drawing analogies. Let 
us call this type of suggestion "suggestion by a textual pattern". In either case now, that is, 
whether a meaning is suggested by allusion, complication, or complement, or whether a 
meaning is suggested by a textual pattern, the author may legitimately deny some of the 
suggestions which hearers or readers may obtain, on the grounds that those rejected suggestions 
are incompatible with the context he may envisage or because of some other good reason he 
may have. Returning to the story about the hedonist: suppose that our predictions are 
sometimes wrong. This may be so because, after all, the author is creating the life of a complete 
person including his conflicts, and these are not likely to be accounted for by our schema of 
what it means to be a hedonist. 
 
Therefore, to the previous duality of implicit in the sense of being linguistically or cognitively 
presupposed, it is possible to add now another duality: meaning suggested by allusion, 
complication, or complement, and meaning suggested by a textual pattern. 
 
When the first sense of a multivocal sentence is arbitrary for obtaining the sentence's second 
sense, this second sense is implicit in any or all of the modes of implicitness mentioned here, 
with one crucial exception: it can never be both linguistically and cognitively presupposed. It is 
only when the relationship between senses is a necessary one that the second sense can and 
must be both linguistically and cognitively presupposed. 
 
Diachronically, that is, from the point of view of the development of language and science, these 
distinctions within implicitness are not clear cut distinctions. For instance, a personal association 
may be "sedimented" and become part of the semantic or pragmatics of an expression, or it may  
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even become part of our knowledge of reality. Synchronically, however, that is, considering 
language and our knowledge of the world at a given moment, those modes of implicitness do  
recognize boundaries which are sharp enough to say, in short, that those distinctions are 
distinctions. 
 
§ 3. — On multivocal sentences whose first sense is arbitrary for obtaining the  
           second sense 
 
When the first sense is arbitrary for obtaining the second sense, the double sense does not arise 
out of the movement at the heart of the sentence. It is not enough to understand what a 
sentence says to realize that one is in the presence of a multivocal expression: it is necessary to 
consider its verbal and non-verbal context. Even before the figurative meaning of a multivocal 
sentence is interpreted, it is by our awareness of its full context that we suspect that a second 
meaning is being intended through an apparently odd sentence. In this manner we are led to 
realize, for instance, that the referent of an expression is not its proper referent but something 
else; or that a given expression is allegorical or rhetorical; or that an expression must be 
interpreted as meaning exactly the opposite of what it actually says. 
 
By "arbitrary to obtain the second sense" I mean that the second sense could have been arrived 
at by some other means; that the second sense could have been obtained through other 
expressions in a direct way. Once the second sense is obtained, the first sense can be disposed 
of; the latter is like an angel bound to become superfluous once his message is conveyed.  
 
When there is an arbitrary relation between the senses of a multivocal expression, it is possible 
to specify with some accuracy the grounds and the number of steps leading us to the second 
sense. For example, if the expression is used to mean the opposite of what it says, we are on 
logical grounds and one step — negation — would suffice to arrive at the second sense. If the 
second sense is the exaggeration of an image which comes from perception, then we are mainly 
on perceptual and imaginative grounds, and the number of steps would depend on the number 
of imaginative combinations necessary to get the exaggerated image, and so on. 
 
Somebody says to us: "I am like a roach", and when we ask for an explanation, he says: "Last 
night I realized, with passive curiosity, that of all the things struggling to mirror me, a roach, 
urgently alert as a man in a shipwreck, was the most successful." What he means is that he feels 
always (always rather than just at a given moment because he realized it, in part, with a passive 
curiosity) in danger of ceasing to be, much like a roach fleeing from a shoe. 
 
His instinct of preservation causes him to be urgently alert. This is a possible interpretation of 
his assertion "I am like a roach" with the necessary help, of course, of his own explanation. Our 
interpretation may not cover all he wants it to mean, but it does cover what he explicitly wants it 
to mean. Thus, for the moment (and perhaps forever, if he does not care to exploit the 
comparison any further) we can say that the meaning of the sentence "I am like a roach" is 
covered by the above interpretation, so that the phrase itself is superfluous both to express and 
obtain its figurative meaning. 
 
No question of synonymity needs to be discussed when the first sense is arbitrary to obtain the 
second sense because it is not the case that all which is comprehended in the expression's 
straightforward meaning has to be comprehended by the expressions which would capture the 
figurative meaning. The meaning of the expression interpreted, and the meaning of the  
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expressions which make the interpretation, are synonyms in the uninteresting form in which the 
definiendum and the definiens of a nominal definition are synonyms. Thus, 
 
"I am like a roach" = df "I am fearful of ceasing to be". 
 
The interpretation defines the aspect in which the metaphorical subject is to be considered 
because, indeed, other aspects of "I am like a roach" could also be imagined; for instance, it 
could be asked that one be seen as always reacting by running to the presence of other people. 
Therefore, the interpretation functions like a folding bridge which is closed by language once 
the interpretation is complete. (The rigor of scientific, univocal language is, in part, due to this 
effect.) 
 
Roughly and artificially, the following operations and steps must take place to go from the literal 
sense of "I am like a roach" to its non-literal sense. First, there is a linguistic operation consisting 
of four steps: (1) separation of the subject-phrase ("I") from the predicative-phrase ("am like a 
roach"); (2) suspension of the subject-phrase and concentration on the predicative-phrase; (3) 
within the predicative-phrase, separation of the connective ("I am like") from that which it 
connects ("a roach"); (4) suspension of the connective and concentration on the carrier of 
properties (a roach). Second, an operation occurs which is done mainly by the imagination, in 
which perception and/or memory may participate, consisting of the following steps: (1) 
perception of a roach or construction of an image of a roach; (2) collection of its properties; (3) 
recovery of the subject-phrase and connective, concentrating on the characteristics of the 
referent of the subject-phrase, ("I"); (4) imaginative construction of the referent of the subject 
phrase, molding it according to the new ideas provided by the interpretation of the predicative-
phrase. 
 
Optimism may account for the beginning of the process just de scribed since the interpreter 
must believe, naively or critically, that a literally awkward sentence may be non-literally 
meaningful. But what accounts for the direction of the entire process? An explanation in terms 
of habits simply postpones the problem. There has to be a pre-predicative feeling of the final 
outcome of the interpretation of a multivocal sentence both before and during the 
interpretation. But what are the relationships between a felt pre-predicative meaning and its 
discursive interpretation? It is so difficult to examine such relationships because, in thinking, we 
find ourselves imprisoned within predicative meaning. 
 
The role of the will in the process under analysis is not always the same: sometimes something 
can be seen as something else only as long as I want to see it that way; such is the fate of false 
multivocal sentences as "a leafless tree is a broom". On the other hand, the fate of all true 
multivocal sentences as "intelligence is a lantern", is such that I cannot avoid seeing something as 
something else after seeing it the way I was once asked to see it. (The truth-value of a multivocal 
sentence can be inferred from the truth-value of the sentences it presupposes and suggests.) 
 
§ 4. — On how the second sense is implicit in the first when the first sense is  
           arbitrary for obtaining the second sense 
 
The taxicab driver was already tooting the horn, but Oscar was not ready yet. Why should he 
be? He did not want to go. "Take your time!", shouted Ethel. To understand the meaning of her 
command, Oscar has to understand the utterance, grasp the tone, know the person who utters 
it, etc. It is not enough to know what the sentence says — that could lead him to miss the whole  
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point. "Hurry up... how can you be so slow!" is suggested mainly by the non-verbal context. This 
last expression (A), since it is obtained from (A) "take your time!" according to our knowledge of 
reality, is similar to those cases in which the relation between senses is a necessary one. (A) and 
(B) differ from those cases in that (B) is not linguistically related to (A). The same is true of "I 
am fearful of ceasing to be" with respect to "I am like a roach". Of course, nothing prevents "fear"  
from becoming part of the semantics of "roach", as nothing prevented time from passing by, 
running, and flying; from being something we give and take, invest and spend, and finally kill. 
 
On the contrary, when the relationship between senses is a necessary one, no awareness of the 
general circumstances is necessary to realize that a sentence is multivocal. The reason is a 
simple one: when the first sense is essential for obtaining the second, the two senses actually 
overlap, so that the second sense is presupposed by the first, and vice versa. When the first 
sense is arbitrary for obtaining the second sense, however, the two senses do not overlap, they 
are connected, thus they need a connective element; such is the role played by the full verbal 
and non-verbal context. This is what I meant by saying that when the first sense is arbitrary for 
obtaining the second, the latter is suggested by the first. 
 
Furthermore, both senses of implicitness, presupposition and suggestion, can be found in one 
and the same multivocal sentence, as one and the same interpretation of multivocal sentence 
can be both presupposed by its literal meaning and suggested by its circumstances, and/or as 
one of its interpretations can be suggested and another presupposed. 
 
§ 5. — On multivocal sentences in which the expression which carries the first  
          sense is necessary for expressing the second sense 
 
Sometimes our experience produces cases of a rare kind when it is impossible to say something 
directly, so that the only way left to express ourselves is by using expressions whose indirect 
meanings are used to express that which is directly ineffable. The impossibility I have in mind is 
not a social impossibility, the kind of impossibility which ordinarily gives rise to literary 
allegories. Now, it is mainly the circumstances which determine the interpretations of allegories. 
May I mention in passing, then, that they can be treated as expressions whose senses are 
arbitrarily related. The kind of impossibility I have in mind in this section is both linguistic and 
metaphysical. Linguistic, because the verbal description of a thing or event is stubbornly indirect 
and figurative. Metaphysical, because such indirect verbal description cannot be made direct 
due to the mode of presentation of the thing or event described. 
 
Consider the sentence (A) "God is an artisan." To understand it, we have to draw the 
comparison between God's skills relevant to the creation of the world and craftsmanship. Yet 
we immediately realize how awkward this is since God, according to our well known myth, is 
not a man, nor does He have bodily skills. "In fact," He is not material at all. Therefore, "God is 
an artisan" is literal nonsense and, figuratively, we are asked to see God as an artisan. 
 
"Artisan" has in this context a double intentionality: the first consists of the literal sense of the 
word — artisan = worker skilled in the mechanics of his art —  plus the set of people properly 
referred to according to this definition. The second intentionality consists of the same definition 
plus its peculiar referent, God. Thus, the second intentionality is built into the first one. To 
understand the double sense, one has to grasp the movement between these two 
intentionalities; it is by understanding the first intentionality, then getting away from it, then 
coming back to it again, that one can grasp the half-revealed "truth" or indirect meaning of (A)  
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which compels me to say that the first, literal sense of (A) is magnetic, for the second sense is 
understandable only by the constant attraction imposed on it by the former. We may try getting 
away from the literal intentionality emphasizing, say, the spiritual character of craftsmanship, 
although, like crabs, we would do so with our eyes fixed upon the point of departure, that is, on 
the literal intentionality. As a result, the point of departure would be less visible at every step, 
while we would not know where we were going. 
 
As soon as we stop considering God as a craftsman, we stop knowing the positive characteristics 
of God. This is important because a referent made up of positive characteristics (e.g., "x is..."  
rather than "x is not..."), not borrowed from the literal set of sense and referent, would make it 
possible for us to measure the distance between the two intentionalities in operations and steps 
other than logical, as well as in logical ones. If we stop knowing the positive characteristics of the 
referent as soon as we get away from the literal meaning, then the constant attraction imposed 
on the figurative meaning by the literal meaning does not give us a chance to measure the 
distance between them in operations and steps other than logical ones. 
 
Thus we must not believe that all multivocal expressions are the result of a tension, or contrast, 
or interaction between two things, whatever they may be, because there are some cases, such as 
the present one, in which there is only one clearly distinguishable element, namely artisan. Of 
course these theories which presuppose two elements can be amended by saying that the 
tension or interaction is not between two (or more) nonverbal things, but between verbal sets. 
 
Even though the God of the Jewish myth is not really like an artisan, one can wonder if it is 
possible to conceive him as being so. It is possible to argue that such a God, at least insofar as 
he is an artisan, is nothing but a literary character. If this is the case, then it makes a difference 
as to his intelligibility, because then the problem in understanding him is reduced to the 
problem of understanding a series of verbal expressions. Nevertheless, with regard to the notion 
of distance, that is, with regard to what is involved in going from one sense to the other, no 
improvement is made with this shift from reality to verbal imaginative conception because it is 
impossible to trace a distance other than a logical one between two real things, a real God and a 
real artisan, one of which is and is not of a certain kind (God is and is not material, etc.), as it is 
also impossible to trace a distance other than logical between the pictorial image evoked by the 
literal intentionality ("artisan" evokes an image in the sense of a picture) and the image (made 
up, for instance, by a series of verbal expressions) evoked by a figurative intentionally.  
 
Whether the figurative interaction is between non-verbal things or between verbal sets, if a 
multivocal expression is such that the expression carrying the first sense is necessary for 
expressing the second sense as well, then there is no distance between senses to be measured 
other than a logical one. 
 
Cases of the "God is an artisan" type are much more difficult to interpret than all the cases 
studied thus far because in those cases there were two intentionalities, either fixed, or in motion. 
In the present case, however, one of its intentionalities disappears when we turn around to see 
it. 
 
When the expression carrying the first sense is essential for expressing the second, the 
expression carrying the first sense is like a sticky substance, for the interpreting expressions 
cannot keep an easy distance from the words expressing the first sense. These cases are to be 
found at the level of lexical semantics where language has perhaps its best chances of being 
creative. A multivocal expression is creative when it calls attention to, or uncovers for us, some  
 
11 
M. Espinoza, A Theory of Metaphor 
aspect of reality. While the multivocal expression is doing this, expressing, or trying to express, 
what it says otherwise (through other words) can be, at worst, misleading. For instance, "wall" is 
not a good interpretation for "curtain", and vice versa, because "curtain", suggests, say, 
temporariness, concealment, and the hands of man; it suggests, for instance, that man wants to 
conceal something for protection against nonhuman events, whereas "wall" suggests division, 
permanency, it could easily be natural; it may have a door, which suggests communication 
rather than concealment, etc. 
 
Once a new aspect unconcealed by the figurative expression has been integrated to our 
knowledge of reality, it may become possible to refer to what the figurative expression refers to 
by other means, although whether its sense can be properly translated will remain an open 
question, and at this moment we are faced with the problem of synonymity. I am inclined to 
believe that if an expression is truly revelatory, then there is absolutely, i.e., regardless of its 
context, no way of rendering the same sense through other words. 
 
One last example. Often in philosophy the insight is the result of the transposition (metaphor = 
transposition or translation) of an image to a different area of experience. For example, the 
concept of truth has a metaphorical name in Greek: "discovery", "unveilment", "unconcealment". 
And Heidegger, who has made this sense of truth his, speaks of untruth in terms of 
dissimulation and concealment; and since every time we uncover something we conceal 
something (as we uncover something and cover something else by digging a hole in the ground 
and throwing the dirt around the hole) every time we tell the truth about something we do not 
allow other truths to appear. I am not familiar with the way the Greeks exploited this 
transposition, but Heidegger explains it in indirect meanings: e.g., the essence of truth, freedom 
is the ex-sistent, revelatory "letting-be" of what-is. This is a case where the insight is a 
transposition of an image which, as all images, is produced by perception, and then the 
imagination transfers it to a nonphysical  region of experience. Furthermore, its written 
expression and explanation are carried out in indirect meanings, so that the first, literal meaning 
of "unconcealment" is necessary to express and obtain its figurative meaning. 
 
§ 6. — On multivocal sentences in which the expression which carries the first 
sense is arbitrary for expressing the second sense 
 
In saying that the words which carry the first sense are essential for expressing the second sense, 
I do not mean that every word carrying the first sense is essential, but only the key ones. What 
words are important is decided by consulting a sentence's verbal and non-verbal context. Upon 
analysis of its meaning, every key word engenders a set of ideas. For instance, "artisan" implies 
that somebody produces something material in a definite period of time, etc. In saying that the 
words which carry the first sense are essential for expressing the second sense, what I mean is 
that the same set of ideas is expressed in both senses. On the other hand, when the words 
carrying the first are arbitrary for expressing the second sense of a multivocal sentence, one set 
of ideas is obtained by analyzing the words carrying the first sense, and another different set by 
analyzing the words carrying the second sense, as happens, for instance, with rhetorical 
sentences in which what is said is, in fact, denied. 
 
I am not now in a position to present a list of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
deciding whether or not the words expressing the first sense of a multivocal sentence are 
necessary or arbitrary for expressing the second sense, but I can mention two central factors 
which must have a bearing on such a decision. 
 
12 
M. Espinoza, A Theory of Metaphor 
I think that fixity or lack of fixity of the intentionalities involved is one central factor. When the 
thought contained in an expression has been clearly connected to other thoughts within a 
linguistic system, it is possible to express the second sense of that expression with words other 
than the ones expressing the first sense, as in "a thought has been born". Suppose that according 
to its context, "a thought has been born" can be put thus: "A thought has just been logically 
obtained from two thoughts." The ideas obtained from the analysis of the meaning of the key 
words of the above paraphrase are different from the ideas obtained by analyzing the meaning 
of birth, which includes offspring, child, etc. But when the thought contained in an expression  
has not been clearly connected to other thoughts within a linguistic system, it is not possible to 
express the second sense in words other than the ones expressing the first sense without 
arbitrarily imposing restrictions on the full meaning of a multivocal sentence. This would 
happen if I insist, for instance, that "passions are the pagans of the soul" means nothing but that 
passions are wrong. 
 
Another central factor is the fixity or lack of fixity of the properties of the referent of a 
multivocal expression. If the properties of a given referent are not very fixed, as happens with 
the properties of passions in general, and the God of the Jewish myth, then it is relatively easy to 
form and deform images according to the demands of figurative sentences. Thus, useful 
multivocal sentences whose referent's properties are not very fixed, are likely to make difficult 
the separation of the referent as it is in itself, as it really is, from the same referent as it is to be 
seen according to the multivocal sentence which says something about it. On the contrary, when 
the properties of a referent are very fixed, as those of a fallen leaf hit by the rain, then it is 
relatively easy to see it as it is and as something else, thus facilitating our saying the second sense 
of an expression as "the rain humiliates the fallen leaves" in a different way. 
 
§ 7. — On multivocal sentences according to their ambiguity 
 
Ambiguity is a property of the meaning of an expression: it is the multiplicity of meaning in and 
of the expression either because the word itself may have several altogether different meanings, 
or because the context may give it several meanings, or both. If it is also a property of the 
intention of the user, or of the reaction of the hearer, it is so because the expression suggests it. 
If it is maintained that a term is ambiguous because there exists a plurality of referents, this 
plurality is made possible by the multiple meaning of the expression. 
 
The word "fire" and other verbal forms derived from it, can refer to physical objects, to 
properties of objects, to states of mind, etc. It is the ambiguity of "fire" which makes this plurality 
of referents possible. On the other hand, it is also true that the ambiguity of an expression 
which has a semantics echoes the many aspects or functions of a thing. This transit between 
ambiguity of expression and manifestations of the referent can be described as "the circle of 
ambiguity". The above description applies to all ambiguous expressions which have a semantic 
value, thus it applies also to multivocal expressions. 
 
Although all multivocal expressions are ambiguous, and vice versa, not all multivocal 
expressions are ambiguous in the same manner. A look at ambiguity is particularly interesting 
when studying multivocal expressions because the meanings which constitute them can be very 
peculiar. 
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How to proceed about distinguishing kinds of multivocal sentences according to their ambiguity 
depends upon one's purpose in studying ambiguity. I am interested in clarity and intelligibility. 
Now, with its many intentionalities, a multivocal sentence asks us to see something as something 
else, and when we are asked to see two things as one, the compatibility of characteristics of the 
elements involved in intentionality facilitates such an act of seeing, having a positive bearing on 
clarity and intelligibility, whereas incompatibility makes such an act difficult or impossible, 
having a negative bearing on clarity and intelligibility. I do not claim that compatibility or 
incompatibility is the only point of view from which the ambiguity of multivocal sentences can 
be considered, but it is, I think the widest useful concept. 
 
To establish whether or not two sets of sense and referent are compatible, one has to disengage 
senses from referents, language from metaphysics, to compare the thoughts expressed and the  
referents described. This disengagement allows to distinguish linguistic and metaphysical 
compatibility or incompatibility. Thoughts are compatible if they are not contradictory. 
Referents are compatible if their essential structure or set of essential properties is not violated 
by seeing the referent as it is (referent within the first intentionality) and as something else or 
from a new perspective (referent within the second intentionality). 
 
For instance, the intentionalities involved in "the artist must be like a cloak" are linguistically and 
metaphysically compatible. Linguistically, for any accurate definition of artist is compatible with 
"the artist dare not fail to see the whole. He must fall evenly on all sides". Metaphysically, for 
nothing prevents us from seeing the artist as he is and as having an accurate and profound 
assessment of the whole which allows him to fall evenly on all sides, like a cloak. 
 
On the contrary, it would be incompatible to see the artist as artist and as a race horse, and it 
would be a contradiction to say, for instance, "the person who creates works of beauty must be 
trained to run and win on already laid out tracks." 
 
Multivocal sentences whose many intentionalities are incompatible are usually used to refer to 
mysterious events and things which are allegedly absolute, ultimate, unconditioned, infinite, etc., 
and since our language seems to be adequate only to predicate about relative and preliminary 
and finite events, we have to suggest that something is the case by saying that it is and that it is 
not like things finite and conditioned. It is in an awkward way that we are able to refer to the 
infinite unconditioned — maybe because nothing in our experience has such extraordinary 
properties. But to the extent that even a curious ambiguity refers to something, it may be 
positive despite its weak appearance. 
 
By considering the distance between the intentionalities of multivocal sentences we can get a 
fairly accurate idea about the degree of clarity and intelligibility displayed in those sentences. 
The higher the number of properties the referent as it is has in common with the referent as it 
is to be seen according to a multivocal sentence, then (a) the smaller is the number of mental 
operations and steps needed to go from one intentionality to the 
other, (b) the closer is the metaphysical distance between intentionalities, and (c) the clearer is 
the sense, the more intelligible is the referent. This criterion allows to assess immediate clarity 
and intelligibility. It says nothing about mediate clarity and intelligibility because an expression 
can be immediately obscure and mediately clear, that is, clear after many operations and steps; 
or an expression can be immediately clear and mediately obscure. 
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On the other hand, the smaller the number of properties the referent as it is has in common 
with the referent as it is to be seen according to a multivocal sentence, the opposite situation 
obtains. 
 
Two referents may share no properties at all, in which case two intentionalities have nothing in 
common from a metaphysical point of view. But bridging the distance between such 
intentionalities is not an impossible task for language, as in the "God is an artisan" example, 
because even if it is impossible for me to see God both as an absolutely immaterial being and as 
an artisan, I can say "God is and is not an artisan." 
 
But a multivocal sentence whose referents share too many properties could hardly be said to be 
an interesting multivocal sentence. (Suppose that we are asked to see a rat as a rabbit.) An  
extreme or a limit would be, then, the scientific ideal: to see something as it really is, which is 
what an exact univocal sentence should do. This would amount to absolute linguistic and 
metaphysical clarity. The other extreme would be to see something as its exact opposite. This 
would amount to absolute linguistic and metaphysical obscurity. 
 
§ 8. — On multivocal sentences according to their vagueness 
 
Whereas ambiguity is a property of an expression, vagueness is a property of a sense of an 
expression. Vagueness of sense is the result of the overlapping of some or all senses of an 
expression. The overlapping of senses has, as consequences, both our confusion as to what 
things are the referents of an expression and our diffuse response to an expression. But 
vagueness of sense may, in its turn, be a consequence of our confusion as to what things are the 
referents of an expression. The transit between the overlapping of senses and the obscurity of 
the boundaries of the referents of an expression occurs in the "circle of vagueness", as the transit 
between multiplicity of sense and manifestations of a referent occurred in the "circle of 
ambiguity". 
 
Senses which are alike in what they say are more likely to overlap than those which are 
dissimilar, and incompatible senses cannot overlap peacefully. If some senses are incompatible, 
then, to overlap, they have to be shaken violently, as salad dressing ingredients. But then, when 
the shake ceases, some elements give up their purity and get mixed, while some others silently 
go back to their places. Similarly, when our intellectual hand relaxes, each sense goes back to its 
historical context. It is in the moment of pressure that the suggestions of some multivocal 
expressions arise. 
 
From the point of view of vagueness then, there are two kinds of multivocal sentences: those 
whose senses lend themselves to the overlapping, such as "falling leaves hit by the rain'" and 
"fallen leaves as conscious things humiliated by the rain" in "the rain humiliates the fallen leaves" 
and, second, there are multivocal expressions whose senses overlap but only reluctantly, such as 
"passions are states of the soul" and "passions are inferior to reason" in "passions are the pagans 
of the soul". 
 
I have divided multivocal sentences according to their vagueness and ambiguity, according to 
the necessity or arbitrariness of the expression carrying the first sense for expressing the second 
sense and, finally, according to the necessity or arbitrariness of the first sense for obtaining the 
second sense. This has been done thinking of the question: what characteristics contribute to  
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the clarity or obscurity of the meaning of a multivocal sentence? (This question is actually 
answered in section (xii)). 
 
In sections (ix), (x), and (xi) the emphasis of this investigation is shifted from sense to referent, 
from our expression and description of reality to reality, from language to metaphysics.  
 
The aim of these sections on referents is to distinguish some central kinds of multivocal 
sentences according to their referents. This end is also a means towards the fulfillment of one of 
the intentions of this investigation, namely, to establish what characteristics contribute to the 
intelligibility or unintelligibility of things as referents of multivocal sentences. 
 
§ 9. — On the referent of multivocal sentences 
 
What will here be said about intelligibility concerns not things in general, that is to say, no 
matter how we may be in contact with them, but things as referents of multivocal sentences. 
When pointing to a cloud I say, "That is a proud cloud," the cloud referred to can also be seen 
by me without my having to say anything about it, and still be intelligible. This is so because I do  
 
not have to think discursively about it to know how to react to its presence. Thus I may keep 
going on my way to the beach without worrying about a possible rain because I may realize, 
prediscursively, that that proud cloud will not water this area. 
 
The mode of being of some things may be such that they are insofar as they are referents of 
multivocal or of any linguistic expression. Macondo, the town in Garc¡a M rquez' 0ne Hundred 
Years of Solitude, comes to life only when we think of it. When the mode of being of a thing is 
like that of Macondo's, then what I say here about intelligibility concerns the entire thing. Of 
course the mode of being of some things is not equivalent to their being referents of multivocal 
or of any linguistic expression. In other words, obviously, there are things which in no way 
depend upon consciousness to exist, as were the things which existed before mankind 
appeared, as will be those things which will exist after mankind disappears. In most cases, the 
referent of a sentence is an aspect of a thing, namely, the aspect referred to by the sense of an 
expression. Thus in most cases what will be said about intelligibility will not concern things in 
their entirety but only some of their aspects. 
 
For the sake of clarity, it has been necessary to keep the elements of multivocal expressions as 
far apart as possible; thus it has been necessary to mention a first and a second referent of 
multivocal expressions. It is crucial that the referent is not intended as one, otherwise it would 
be impossible to consider something as something else, to "see" something in another thing. If 
this were impossible, almost our entire mental life would be impossible, for at least in 
imagining, thinking, and willing, we can consider things as not obeying the laws of identity and 
individuation. 
 
Although the intention of regarding the referent of a multivocal sentence as one is always 
fulfilled, even if only linguistically, to consider something as something else, or, to "see" 
something which is not ordinarily in a thing as part of that thing, may require different amounts 
of efforts. (Try to "see" passive sadness as gloom, leafless trees as rakes, and an absolutely 
immaterial power as an artisan.) The kind and amount of effort needed to consider something 
as something else, or to "see" something which is not ordinarily in a thing as part of that thing, 
depends upon whether or not the referent involved lends itself to such act of "seeing". Exactly  
 
16 
M. Espinoza, A Theory of Metaphor 
what determines whether or not a referent lends itself to such act has to be a function of its 
characteristics, its structure, its context, and the "set" of the reader's mind. 
 
§ 10. — On multivocal sentences according to the relationship between thought  
             and referent 
 
This discussion is centered on things in their relationship to thinking. Of course, things are also 
related to consciousness in several other ways, for instance, in pre-reflexive perception, and 
imagination. Since I am not dealing with things in an unqualified way but as objects of 
multivocal expressions, and since the sense of these expressions is a thought, I have to focus on 
the object's relationship to thought. But as soon as images and perceptions acquire a verbal 
dimension, they fall within the jurisdiction of what is said about thinking. To the extent that any 
activity of consciousness is verbal, to that extent the name "thought" is here applicable. (For  
convenience, by "thought" I mean here an explicit linguistic event, although of course there can 
be thought without language as it happens in intuitive thinking and in animal thinking).  
 
There are people who do not believe that the things which thoughts are about are touched by 
the thinking directed towards them. But is it not true that the way we verbally express a feeling, 
for instance, can actually alter the feeling itself? Would the feeling of passive sadness be the 
same were it not understood as "gloom"? I do not think so. When the verbal expression of 
something helps to constitute that something, what the former says does alter the latter, and the 
thing or event thus altered can be, in its turn, altered by other experiences, etc. Therefore, I 
cannot agree with those who say that the objects to which thoughts refer are always beyond 
thoughts, always transcendent to them. 
 
Furthermore, it is only in a superficial and uninteresting sense that physical objects of sensory 
perception are not sensitive to my thoughts. A corpse continues to be an object no matter how 
clearly I say: "I want you to live." But a corpse is an entity constructed in part (of course, only in 
part) by me, a consciousness. In this construction there is an explicit or implicit participation of 
verbal thinking. A corpse is a terrible entity. Yet what is terrible about it is not what is there, 
inert and pale in front of me, for I can be inclined to kiss its forehead. What is terrible is that it, 
the corpse, cannot do what the person used to do; it cannot do what the person had chosen to 
do. This we know in part by making inferences many of which are verbal. An objective 
relational property, like terribleness, is what it is in part due to my thoughts. A non-relational 
property, like paleness, is insensitive to my thoughts. But paleness as such is a superficial and 
uninteresting color, in sharp contrast to the depth and moving aspect of terrible paleness.  
 
I can distinguish now at least two kinds of referents. (1) There are those which are not directly 
affected by thought because they are thought-independent, as are the things which existed 
before the appearance of mankind, or as numbers, and, in general, as all the mathematical 
entities. (2) There are also referents which are partially affected by thoughts, as terrible things 
are, because they are partially thought-dependent. 
 
The second kind of referent suggests the question: Are there referents which are totally affected 
by thoughts? I believe there are. Suppose that I were to comment on the thoughts expressed in 
this investigation. My comments would definitely affect the investigation itself, for instance, by 
suggesting to the reader how to interpret what has already been done, and by suggesting to 
myself how to continue it. Feelings and thoughts, among other events, are not massive rocks on  
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the seashore; they are more like the ocean's skin, folded and unfolded by the rumors of the 
wind. 
 
It is possible to add, then, a third kind of referent, namely (3) those that may be affected by 
thought both totally and directly. 
 
I do not know if the referents of this third kind are totally or only partially thought-dependent. 
Perhaps there are opaque corners in a referent which remain so after it has been transformed 
into something else by a thought, and these opaque spots may become manifest at a later time. 
But there are moments in which it is evident to us that a thought, or a series of them, can 
change some things completely, as happens with feelings and wishes and also with thoughts. 
 
Mathematical entities deserve here a special mention because they are transparent and remain 
identical to themselves. These properties account for the fact that they are the most intelligible 
referents. Transparency is important because to know something we have to manipulate it. If 
some thing is wholly transparent, our manipulations of it will not change its value or meaning.  
 
Identity is also important because it allows us to examine an object as it is for as long as we need 
to. All of which facilitates agreement as to what people say with respect to an object. This is 
crucial because it allows us to verify what we say, to revise our results in light of the knowledge 
of others. 
 
Among the least intelligible referents we find some of those which belong to kind (1), real, 
thought-independent things, to the extent that they may have a substratum not reachable by 
consciousness. Think of objects which are either infinitely small or infinitely large. They are 
conceived only indirectly through our knowledge of the things available to consciousness. 
Language and mathematical formalisms are here very useful as they allow us to have a hint of a 
world which will remain forever out of our vision. 
 
§ 11. — On multivocal sentences according to the recurrence of the referent 
 
It is the verbal and non-verbal context of a multivocal sentence which indicates what is its 
referent. For instance, it is the circumstances and the mythic-symbolic language surrounding the 
expression "God created the earth in six days" that allows us to know immediately that "God", for 
instance, does not refer to an ordinary artist or craftsman, but to an extraordinary one. The 
referent's access to the understanding, or, in other words, its intelligibility, largely depends upon 
its context's access to the understanding, which in its turn largely depends upon its recurrence.  
 
To know whether what is said about something is fair or unfair, considerate or inconsiderate, 
etc., we have to go back to the referent and its context, but if either or both of them are not 
available any longer, then what is said is condemned to remain uncertain, or at least 
unconvincing: it would have no more validity than gossip. Without uniform repetition of the 
referent and its context, understanding and knowledge are bound to become weaker and 
weaker, as an oath without renewal. 
 
Whether the referent and context which are available again in the future will be more or less 
like the ones that appeared in the past has to be a function of several things, such as the degree 
of particularity or generality of a referent and its context, whether they are concrete or abstract, 
and our point of view or purpose. 
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According to the recurrence of the referent there are, then, five kinds of multivocal sentences: 
there are those whose referents appear (1) repeatedly and with uniformity, (2) repeatedly and 
without uniformity, (3) seldom and with uniformity, (4) seldom and without uniformity, and 
finally (5) there are those multivocal expressions whose referents appear only once. 
 
Multivocal sentences of kind (1) have referents whose intelligibility may be maximal. On the 
other extreme, sentences of kind (5) have referents whose intelligibility may be minimal.  
 
§ 12. — On clarity, obscurity, intelligibility, and unintelligibility 
 
We are now in a position to bring to the surface the characteristics of multivocal sentences 
which contribute to clarity, obscurity, intelligibility, or unintelligibility.  
 
Each one of the following characteristics constitutes a type of clarity of sense or intelligibility of 
referent: 
 
(1) The first sense of a multivocal sentence has to be arbitrary for obtaining its second sense. 
 
(2) The second sense of a multivocal sentence has to be suggested, for instance, by allusion, 
complication, complement, or by a textual pattern. 
 
(3) The expression embodying the first sense of a multivocal sentence has to be arbitrary for 
expressing its second sense. 
 
(4) The intentionalities of a multivocal sentence have to be fixed. 
 
(5) Any ambiguity the sentence has must be made up of compatible senses. 
 
(6) Whatever vagueness there is has to be the result of the "voluntary" overlapping of the several 
senses of the sentence. 
 
(7) The referent of the multivocal sentence must be transparent and remain self-identical. 
 
(8) The referent of the multivocal sentence has to appear repeatedly and uniformly.  
 
The higher the number of characteristics contributing to clarity found in an expression, the 
clearer such an expression is. 
 
The clearest multivocal sentence possible combines all the characteristics contributing to clarity 
and intelligibility.  
 
Each one of the following characteristics constitutes a type of obscurity of sense or 
unintelligibility of referent: 
 
(1) The first sense of a multivocal sentence has to be necessary for obtaining its second sense. 
 
(2) The second sense of a multivocal sentence has to be both linguistically and cognitively 
presupposed by the other sense. 
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(3) The expression embodying the first sense of a multivocal sentence has to be essential for 
expressing its second sense. 
 
(4) The intentionalities of a multivocal sentence have to be in a constant state of movement. 
 
(5) Any ambiguity the sentence has must be made up of incompatible senses.  
 
(6) Whatever vagueness there is has to be the result of the "reluctant" overlapping of the several 
senses of the sentence. 
 
(7) The referent of the multivocal sentence must be opaque and change all the time.  
 
(8) The referent of the multivocal sentence must appear neither repeatedly nor uniformly. 
 
The higher the number of characteristics contributing to obscurity found in an expression, the 
more obscure such an expression is. 
 
The most obscure multivocal sentence possible combines all the characteristics contributing to 
obscurity and unintelligibility.  
 
As I said early in this investigation, understanding and knowing are considered as transparent 
with respect to clarity and intelligibility. Therefore, a clear sentence is one I, or any 
consciousness, understands, whereas one does not understand an obscure expression. Likewise, 
one knows an intelligible referent, whereas one does not know an unintelligible thing. 
 
 
 
*  *  * 
                    
 
 
 
